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Social Security: Strengthen Not Dismantle
MICHAEL M. 0. SEIPEL
Brig ham Young University
School of Social Work
Social Security has benefited more than 55 million people. It has
lifted about 14 million seniors and 6 million more people out of
poverty without adding a penny to the federal budget. Social Se-
curity is increasingly becoming an important source of income
for many people. Despite the projected shortfall, the program will
continue to meet its obligations for the next two decades, and
with minor adjustments, it can be on solid footing for the next
75 years. Cutting the benefits or privatizing may not be the best
approach. This paper discusses the structure and function of
Social Security and what can be done to strengthen the program.
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security, social insurance
The Social Security program has been one of the most suc-
cessful national social insurance programs to date, but it has
been highly misunderstood by lay persons as well as politi-
cians and even professionals who study the issue. For more
than 77 years, despite economic ups and downs and political
turmoil, it has never missed a single payment to eligible recipi-
ents. Furthermore, with minor adjustments this program will
be able to pay out promised benefits for the next 75 years and
beyond (The Board of Trustees, 2012). Social Security is not
broken; it is doing what it was designed to do. Yet for several
decades opponents have systematically mounted attacks on
Social Security in the belief that it is the cornerstone of a welfare
state and that when it is dismantled, the rest of the welfare pro-
grams will follow (Bandow, 2012; Laursen, 2012; Pollin, 2012).
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Over the years critics of Social Security have tried to dis-
mantle the program through strategies of misinformation or
exaggerated statements. Recently, Tanner (2011) contended
that Social Security is nothing more than a criminal enterprise
like a Ponzi scheme since it generates no investments and the
current recipients rely on future contributors' ability to pay.
Some have argued that the only reason the program has lasted
this long is because workers were forced to pay higher and
higher taxes over the years. They also point out that even
though there are nominal interest earnings reserved for Social
Security, they are generated by a worthless non-negotiable
Treasury bond that cannot be sold or redeemed. As such, they
believe that the only way to pay the full benefit is to either
borrow or increase taxes (Bandow, 2012; Gokhale, 2010; John,
2011). Critics have declared that the system is now plummet-
ing toward insolvency because it is presently paying out more
than it brings in (since 2010), and if nothing is done about it,
the trust fund will be depleted by 2033 (Bandow, 2012; Tanner
2011). To keep the program solvent for the next 75 years, they
project that it will require an additional $15 trillion or more
to be financed through the federal budget, further contrib-
uting to an already unsustainable national debt burden. For
decades, opponents of Social Security have reminded taxpay-
ers that Social Security is broken and will not be there for them
(Gokhale, 2010; Tanner, 2012).
Despite their claims, many of the critics' observations are
erroneous. For instance, the critics of Social Security have
overstated their case when they say Social Security is insol-
vent. Supporters point out that, in reality, Social Security has
remained solvent not only because of increased taxes, but
more importantly because more people have paid into the
system than drawn out, creating a surplus. However, the
Social Security program does face several challenges that need
to be addressed. The Trustees of Social Security (2012) agree
that both moderate and long-term financing solutions must
be found to put the program on sound footing for the future.
This paper discusses the structures and functions of the Social
Security program and then considers policy options that are
coherent with the current reality.
70
Social Security: Strengthen not Dismantle
Structure and Function of Social Security
Social Security is Self-Funded
Social Security operates independently from the unified
federal budget, with its own dedicated funds, even though it
still appears under the unified federal budget for the purpose
of accounting. Social Security is not a line-item expense in the
federal budget. Unlike other government programs, it is au-
thorized to spend only what income it is able to generate, pri-
marily through payroll taxes and earned interests. The Social
Security Administration (SSA) is prohibited from borrowing,
thus it cannot deficit spend. When there are any shortfalls in
the fund, the benefit is automatically reduced (U.S. Senate,
2010). From the beginning, Social Security has paid out ev-
erything it owes from its own resources; it has not borrowed
a single penny from the government or anyone else. Hence,
Social Security has nothing to do with the current, or any past,
budget deficits or long-term federal debts.
Over the life of the program, Social Security has collected
$15.5 trillion and spent $12.8 trillion, leaving about $2.7 trillion
in the reserve at the end of 2011 (National Academy of Social
Insurance, 2012). The current federal budget deficit may have
stemmed from tax cuts given to the wealthy, two unfunded
wars, the Medicare drug program, high unemployment, the
Wall Street bailout and other programs-certainly not from
Social Security. Cutting Social Security benefits will not help
the budget deficit; it will only hurt recipients who are now just
getting by with modest benefits. Whereas, if unwarranted sub-
sidies to special interest groups were cut today, it would lower
the budget deficits by a corresponding amount immediately.
Social Security is an Insurance Program
Social Security is more than a pension paid to support the
income of retired workers. The program is designed also to
insure and protect families. The Social Security program, also
known as OASDI, covers survivors of deceased workers (about
6 million), disabled workers and their dependents (11 million),
and retired workers and their dependents (38 million). All to-
gether about 1 out of 6 people, or 55 million, received some
form of Social Security benefits in 2011 (The Board of Trustees,
2012).
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Social Security is a relatively comprehensive insurance
package that is designed to provide financial security and
peace of mind at a relatively reasonable cost. Purchasing
private insurance that would cover the full extent of Social
Security protection would be cost-prohibitive for average
wage earners. If a retired person at age 65 was to purchase a
private annuity that paid $1,230/month (2012 SS payout) with
a cost-of-living increase, and which paid the widowed spouse
for the rest of his or her life, that person would be expected to
pay a lump sum of about $430,000 (Thrift Savings Plan, 2012).
Furthermore, a worker at age 30 with children would need to
purchase about $450,000 in life insurance and $330,000 in dis-
ability insurance to receive the same protection as that provid-
ed by Social Security (Nicols, 2008). In all, beneficiaries typi-
cally get more from OASDI than they contribute to the system
over their lifetime. For example, a one-earner couple earning
an average of $43,000 (2011 earnings) will contribute $299,000
into the system, but the lifetime benefit will be $448,000. This is
typical of almost all earners except for single male earners and
two earner couples who earn on the average of $43,000 each
(Steuerle & Rennane, 2011).
Cash Reserve not Critical
Social Security outlay exceeded revenue at the end of 2010
and the costs of the program are projected to exceed income
for the next 75 years (John, 2012), but the program is neither
insolvent nor was this problem unanticipated. The detractors
of the program have incorrectly concluded that the program
had finally reached an intractable crisis as Social Security
went "cash negative" in 2010. They also claim that funding
will continue to deteriorate as baby boomers move into retire-
ment (Bandow, 2012; John, 2012). It is true that a cash imbal-
ance occurred sooner than was originally forecasted, but what
is missed by the critics of Social Security is that even if no
changes are made, it will continue to pay out full benefits in a
timely manner for the next 20 or more years. Social Security has
about $2.7 trillion in the reserve, which will continue to grow
to about $3.1 trillion by 2021 (The Board of Trustees, 2012).
What is also missed by the critics is that the interest income
earned each year from the reserve has helped the growth of the
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trust fund. This interest income is guaranteed by the full faith
and credit of the United States government. Together with
payroll taxes and interest income, Social Security will continue
to pay out in full until the reserve is finally exhausted in 2033.
At that point, Social Security will continue to make payments
because the current workers will keep paying into the system.
Even if nothing is done today to make the program solvent for
the next 75 years, Social Security will still be able to pay out
benefits equal to 75% of the full amount by 2033 and at a 73%
level by 2086 (The Board of Trustees, 2012). Given the wide-
spread support of this program, it is highly unlikely that no
action would be taken to make it solvent.
Operating "cash negative" is not an illegitimate or con-
troversial practice among financial industries. The nation's
private pension system, for example, collected slightly less
than it needed to pay out, but then used investment income to
balance its operating costs (Burtless, 2011). Burtless (2011) notes
that between the years 1985 and 2008, the private pension was
"cash negative" in 23 out of 24 years, yet it was able to meet
all of its obligations on the strength of $4.5 trillion in earned
investment income.
From 1937 to 1983, Social Security paid its own way primar-
ily through payroll taxes with a limited reserve. In fact, in the
first 47 years of the program, Social Security was "cash nega-
tive" for 21 years. Operating "cash negative" is not always an
ideal practice, but it is not a hindrance either if there are other
dedicated funds, like interest earnings, to meet the obligations.
Historically, having a large trust fund for Social Security has
been the exception rather than the rule. It was in 1983 that
Social Security began building up a large reserve to address
the immediate shortfall and to principally pre-fund benefits
for the pending retirement of a large number of baby boomers
(Burtless, 2011; Michel, Morrissey, & Ballantyne, 2012).
Benefits are Important to Seniors
Social Security benefits are modest but do provide a base
income for retired workers. The average retired worker at age
65 receives about $1,230 per month, which does not provide
a secure living but, when supplemented with an employer-
based pension and personal savings, can maintain a decent
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standard of living (The Board of Trustees, 2012). In the climate
of economic downturns and ever-decreasing traditional de-
fined-pension plans from employers, Social Security is increas-
ingly becoming an important source of income for seniors.
The Social Security benefit is particularly important to
retired low-wage workers for three compelling reasons. First,
the program is designed to provide proportionally larger cash
benefits to low-income retired workers, even though they con-
tribute less than high-wage earners to Social Security taxes.
This progressive redistributive feature has made it possible for
retired low-income workers to maintain some degree of inde-
pendence and dignity. This outcome is commonly measured
by comparing a worker's pre-retirement income with the
after retirement benefits, or the replacement rate. The Social
Security benefit replaces about 55% of pre-retirement income
to those who earned on the average $19,400. The rate is about
41% for those with average earnings of $43,000, about 34% for
earnings of $68,000, and about 27% for those who earn more
than $106,800 (The Board of Trustees, 2012).
Second, Social Security makes up a significant portion of
seniors' incomes. Nearly two in three seniors get at least half
of their income from Social Security, and one in three relies
on Social Security for almost all of their income (SSA, 2012).
Third, Social Security is one of the most effective anti-poverty
programs for seniors. Ruffing (2012a), by using various 2010
government documents, calculated that Social Security has
lifted nearly 14 million seniors out of poverty. Without Social
Security, it is estimated that about 44% of seniors would be in
poverty (U.S. Senate, 2010). Moreover, Social Security has kept
about one million children and more than five million people
in the 18-to-64 age group out of poverty. In all, Social Security
has lifted about 20 million people out of poverty (Ruffing,
2012a).
While the Social Security program has helped countless
people, it should be noted that there is a need for moderniza-
tion of the program because of the changing demographics in
our society. For instance, the program is inadequate in meeting
the needs of the more vulnerable populations, such as low-in-
come single workers, caregivers, and people who don't have
a long work history for various reasons, or are lifetime low-
income workers (United States Senate, 2010).
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Analysis of Proposed Options
In 2012, Social Security Trustees (2012) declared that pol-
icy-makers should take reasonable approaches to strengthen
Social Security so that the program will have sufficient funds
for the next 75 years and also to secure greater public confi-
dence in the program. This, along with the mounting national
debt, has resulted in a bipartisan call for cutting Social Security
benefits to protect the program, even though Social Security is
currently good for roughly two more decades and has not con-
tributed to the national deficit in any degree. The most often
stated recommendations are raising the retirement age, modi-
fying the cost-of-living adjustment index (COLA), and priva-
tizing the program.
Raising the Retirement Age
Raising the retirement age has already generated economic
hardships for seniors. Raising the retirement age from 65 to 66
has amounted to cutting the benefits by roughly 6-7%, and for
those who must wait until 67 the loss will be about 13%. For
example, by waiting to claim the benefit at 66 instead of 65,
one's real benefit will be $933 (if the base benefit was $1000).
The real benefit would be $867 if seniors must wait until 67
to make a claim. Similarly, the penalty for choosing to apply
for early benefits at age 62 will be steeper and the bonus re-
ceived for claiming late benefits will be smaller (Ruffing &
Van de Water, 2011). Further, raising the retirement age to 69
or 70 as recommended under the Bowles-Simpson plan would
bring even greater economic hardship to seniors (Kingson &
Morrissey, 2012; Ruffing, 2012b). Using a baseline of 67 as a
retirement age which will phase in shortly, the 69-year-old re-
tiree's real benefit would be cut by 14%, and 70-year-old retir-
ees would see their real benefits cut by 20% (Ruffing & Van de
Water, 2011).
Increasing the retirement age will also escalate income in-
equality among various income groups, since Social Security
benefits will have a differential impact on overall household
assets. By using the Federal Reserve Board's 2007 Survey of
Consumer Finances, Rosnick and Baker (2012) show that the
lowest wealth quintile of non-homeowner couples in the 35-44
age cohorts in 2012 will lose about 18% of their wealth, while
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the top quintile will lose only 8%. These kinds of patterns dis-
played consistently when each cohort was compared to all
other income cohorts. Any delay in Social Security benefits
through increase in retirement age will have greater impact
on the economic well-being of low to moderate income house-
holds, since Social Security income is the largest source of their
wealth. Many low to moderate income families do not have
pensions or savings, and any assets they may have accumu-
lated over the years have disappeared with housing bubbles
and market slides (Rosnick & Baker, 2012).
Ostensibly, proponents for raising the retirement age argue
that the increase is warranted, since life expectancy has risen
but retirement age has not (Gokhale, 2010). What they don't
say is that overall life expectancy appears to be higher mainly
because fewer children die today than 70 years ago. The life
expectancy for seniors of earlier decades as compared with
today's is not very different. Any real gains in life expectancy
are largely made by high-income workers (6.5 years), whereas
low-income workers gained less than two additional years
of life expectancy (Rosnick, 2010). Therefore, the retirement
age increase from 65 to 67 which is currently phasing in will
mostly nullify any life expectancy gains made by low-income
workers.
Change the Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) Index
Changing the Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) from
Consumer Price Index (CPI-W) to CPI-U, or "chained" CPI,
is economically harmful to seniors whose Social Security ben-
efits have already dropped sizably by raising the retirement
age. Supporters of this approach argue that the change will
more accurately reflect the true cost of living (Reno, Bethell, &
Walker, 2011; Reno & Walker, 2011). By changing the index, it
is assumed that seniors will minimize the impact of inflation
by making a different choice of similar products or purchas-
ing dissimilar products in response to price changes, so that
instead of purchasing a name brand toothpaste, they would
purchase a no-name brand or choose to purchase food instead
of fuel. If this assumption holds, the Chief Actuary of Social
Security estimates that it can reduce about .3% in the cost-of-
living pay schedule (U.S. Senate, 2010; Veghte, Reno, Bethell,
& Walker, 2011).
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Thus far, there is no evidence of shifting purchases taking
place to hedge against inflation among seniors. Unlike average
families who might more easily respond to price changes,
seniors with a modest income already have limited purchas-
ing options, as they pay out a bigger share of their income on
health care. They not only spend two to three times more for
health care now, but the price of health care is expected to con-
tinue to grow faster than other consumer products and ser-
vices. Medicare Part B, for instance, grew more than 15 fold
from $7.20 in 1976 to $115 in 2011, and it is not expect to level
off anytime soon (Veghte et al., 2011).
If the switch from CPI-W to chained CPI takes place, it
can be expected that all seniors will lose benefits immediately
even though it is a modest .3% in the first year. However, it
will be about 3% after 10 years, 6% after 20 years, and after 30
years, seniors would lose about 9%. Social Security income is
a particularly large portion of total income for older seniors
and any cut could decrease their standard of living substan-
tially. The traditional COLA index adopted in 1972 to calculate
Social Security benefits may have been an important factor in
keeping seniors from falling into poverty and other economic
hardships (Baker & Rosnick, 2011).
Privatize Social Security
A full or partial privatization of Social Security was a
flawed idea in 2005 and it is still a poor idea today. The pro-
ponents of privatization argue that workers would have more
money in their retirement accounts if they put their money
in the stock market rather than in the Social Security system.
Tanner (2012) notes that real long-term investment in stocks
has yielded almost a 7% return rate, so that if the hypothetical
middle income earners had invested half of their payroll taxes
in a private investment beginning in 1968, they would have
received $2,067 each month from investment income in 2011
instead of the $1,338 Social Security payment. Low-income
earners who did the same would receive $1,096 investment
income instead of $891 from Social Security.
While private investment appears to be advantageous,
this approach has two major concerns. One, the return on the
private investment is often overstated. Krugman (2005) claims
that when certain factors are taken into account (such as when
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the market corrects itself, investment is diversified for safety,
management fees are taken out, and the like), the real return
rate might be about 2.7% rather than 7%-not much different
than what one might get from the Social Security Treasury bill.
Empirical evidence from the Chilean study seems to support
Krugman's claim. Though Chile is a small economy compared
to the Unites States, its experience shows that individual ac-
counts invested in the market had little or no economic advan-
tage over those who stayed in the traditional Social Security
system. While individual accounts provided more economic
benefit for mostly affluent workers, Social Security was a
better option for low-income workers (Cerda, 2008; Dattalo,
2007; Laursen, 2012).
Two, having choices and a higher return on the invest-
ment is desirable, but it usually comes with higher risks and
many uncertainties. Some may benefit from this arrangement,
especially the fund managers and brokers, but the real risk is
that many seniors may lose. Seniors must understand that the
market is volatile and past market performance is no guaran-
tee that it will continue to perform at the same rate. The market
meltdown of 2008-2009 is instructive to all. A mistake made in
the market can lead to economic devastation for seniors. Stiglitz
(2005) believes that people who lack a proficient knowledge in
the nuances of markets and financial instruments are vulner-
able to making mistakes. The problem is compounded if they
are misinformed or deceived. They then become susceptible
to exploitation and may eventually end up losing assets they
have already accumulated. Investing in the market is inherent-
ly risky. Any failed private investment account or severe stock
market downturn would inevitably pull the government into
bailing out liabilities created from such events as was the case
in Great Britain. Stiglitz (2005) quips that if the stock market
was safe and always would yield a promised high return, the
federal debt could be wiped out in a few years by the govern-
ment investing in the indexed stock exchange. Thus far, no one
has advocated such a plan.
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Tablel. Policy Options
Income
as % of % of




Increase worker/employer tax by 1.1% 2.09 104
Increase worker/employer tax by 1% in 2.06 1032022 and by additional 1% in 2052
Increase worker/employer tax by 1.39 691/20% annually over 20 years
Enhance collection of existing taxes n/a n/a
Broaden the Revenue Base
Eliminate the cap
(do not count additional earnings)
Eliminate the cap
(count the earnings toward benefit)
Eliminate the cap
(count the earnings toward benefit but 2.17 108
use different formula)
Gradually restore the cap to cover 90%
of earnings for workers and eliminate 1.37 69
cap for employers
Gradually restore the cap to cover 60 2890% of earnings
Extend coverage to newly hired
non-covered state and local .17 9
government workers
Treat all salary reduction plans as 25 12income [e.g., 401(k)]
Adapted from U. S. Senate Committee on Aging (2010).
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Strengthening Social Security
There are several workable options to strengthen Social
Security. Turning the program into a private enterprise, reduc-
ing benefits through raising the retirement age, or switching
the COLA index would not be the best approaches. There are
other promising options. Raising revenue and broadening the
revenue base are more reasonable policy options for strength-
ening the Social Security program without hurting those who
rely on the program the most. Table 1 presents several notable
options identified by the Special Committee on Aging of the
United States Senate in 2010.
Raise Revenue
The unfunded obligation of $8.6 trillion over the next 75
years can be resolved with several variations of revenue in-
crease or in combination with other options (The Board of
Trustees, 2012; U.S. Senate, 2010). For instance, as seen in Table
1, increasing worker and employer payroll contributions by 1.1
% alone would be more than sufficient to take care of the entire
shortfall for the next 75 years. Despite the clear-cut nature of
this approach, in the current political environment any lump
sum tax increase may not be acceptable. Therefore, to avoid
any political opposition, it may be more agreeable to increase
the tax rate at 1/ 2 0th of one percent for the next twenty years
beginning in 2015. This would raise contributions by $26.50 per
year, or about 50 cents a week for average workers, and would
cover the shortfall by 69% (U.S. Senate, 2010). Adjustments to
make Social Security more viable are nothing new. Throughout
the life of the program, timely tax increases have been put in
place to meet the benefit obligations. Since the last tax increase
took place in 1990, a small adjustment now would not be un-
reasonable (Baker & Rosnick, 2011; Reno & Walker, 2012).
Broadening Revenue Base
Table 1 also shows that there are several ways the Social
Security revenue base can be expanded to address the long-
term financial shortfall. Though each has several positive fea-
tures, one of the most fair and effective ways to settle the long-
term shortfall is to rework the cap on taxable earnings, which
is set at $110,100 (The Board of Trustees, 2012). While there are
several variations, gradually setting the cap to tax 90% of all
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earnings will decrease the shortfall by about 28%. This would
be sufficient to take care of any shortfall when combined with
the incremental tax increase (1/20 of one percent) already sug-
gested and/or other options identified in Table 1 (U.S. Senate,
2010).
In 1977 Congress authorized Social Security to broaden its
revenue base by taxing 90% of all wages and providing for a
cap to rise with inflation. Currently about 85% of all earnings
are taxed instead of 90% because most of the income increase
went to the top 6% of earners (Reich, 2011). In other words,
most of the income increase went to those who were earning
more than the $110,100 cap; as a consequence, any income
above the cap is not taxed. If the 90% taxing level is set now,
the cap would be at about $180,000 (Reich, 2011). The proposed
plan would fully phase in over about 40 years, naturally with
a different cap amount. Under the proposed plan, there would
be no change for 94% of the people who are earning under the
new cap (U.S. Senate, 2010). Raising the ceiling to generate ad-
ditional revenue is a logical response to the concentration of
wealth at the top. This approach is consistent with the intent
of the Congress and is reasonably workable. Parenthetically,
if a different option were chosen, such as eliminating the cap
all together and not increasing the benefits on those addition-
al contributions, it could be more than enough to make the
program solvent for the next 75 years and beyond, but it may
not be politically expedient. It is plain that adopting any of the
available options or a combination of options found in Table
1 would effectively mend any long-term shortfalls found in
Social Security.
Conclusion
For nearly 78 years the Social Security program has paid
out its financial obligations to seniors and qualified families
with full fidelity in a timely manner within their budget struc-
ture. Therefore, unlike many federal programs, Social Security
has not contributed to federal deficits or debts. In fact, over
the years the federal government has used Social Security
surplus funds to balance the budget, pay down debts, finance
various federal programs, and to generally keep the other
taxes low (Bergmann, 2005). After having benefited from the
Social Security assets, the government should not blame Social
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Security nor should it turn its back on the promise it made to
pay back what it has borrowed from social security surplus
funds. The government could come up with the revenue as
needed either by levying additional taxes or cutting other pro-
grams. It is true that the program will face a sizable shortfall as
the program moves into the next 75 years, but Social Security
is neither broken nor in crisis. Social Security can be on solid
footing for many years by making a few modest changes.
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